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ABSTRACT

The Republic of Kazakstan--the world's ninth largest country--is one of five central Asian nations created in 1991 upon the demise of the former Soviet Union. Never a separate political state in the past, Kazakstan now faces a myriad of curricular and educational organization problems related to contemporary economic and political developments, as well as to its particular history and culture. Ethnic Kazaks are trying to construct a national identity and sense of history for ideological and political socialization purposes. At the same time, however, their hoped-for "transition to a market economy" has the nation in a severe fiscal tailspin. This essay reviews Kazakstan's political and economic dynamics, effects on secondary education, and the emerging role of secondary education in social stratification. Following a description of Kazakstan's colonial legacy and the structure of schooling under Soviet control, educational reform movements of the late 1980s are described. These reform efforts have been disrupted by severe economic crisis and other factors, including the need for new curricular materials and teacher training; absence of experience in educational planning and administration; lack of computers, textbooks, and other resources; and lack of fluent speakers of the Kazak language. The new market economy has brought poverty and its attendant problems with it. Rural schools (80 percent of total) are particularly disadvantaged. Corruption and bribery are widespread, guaranteeing success in secondary school and admission to higher education; wealthier parents send their children to private schools; and no government policies address educational inequalities. At higher levels, political leaders are allowing schools to deteriorate, seemingly as a concession to private sector development. Contains references. (Author/SV)

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ISSUES IN POST-SOVIET SECONDARY SCHOOL REFORM: THE CASE OF KAZAKSTAN

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ABSTRACT

The Republic of Kazakstan is one of five central asian nations created in 1991 upon the demise of the former Soviet Union. Unlike former Soviet republics of Eastern Europe, however, Kazakstan was never a separate state in the political sense until just now, and even its current autonomy is critically dependent upon economic and political developments in Russia. Kazakstan today thus faces a myriad of curricular and educational organization problems related both to contemporary economic and political developments, as well as to its particular historical and cultural history. At the current time, ethnic Kazaks - for the first time in many decades a majority of residents in their own country - are trying to construct a "useable past" for ideological and political socialization purposes. At the same time, however, their hoped-for "transition to a market economy" has the nation in a severe fiscal tailspin. The purpose of the following essay is to introduce the reader to the economic and political dynamics of Kazakstan, now the world's ninth largest country. We also pay particular attention to how the current political and economic dilemmas affect the system of secondary education, and to the emerging role of secondary education upon social stratification.

ISSUES IN POST-SOVIET SECONDARY SCHOOL REFORM:

THE CASE OF KAZAKSTAN 1

The Republic of Kazakstan was created in 1991 as an independent state in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now the ninth largest nation of the world geographically, it is one of five sister Central Asian states all formerly under the rule of Moscow, and all interested to some degree in transforming an inherited colonialist and socialist education system into one with more freedom, flexibility and the purposes of nation building. In this essay we attempt to describe and analyze the major social and economic development themes which have emerged today in Kazakstan, and to link such developments to the status of education reform and restructure currently underway. Our insights into matters following come from interviews with key government and school leaders; from official statistics of the Kazakstan Ministry of Education (MoE), from four recent reports by international agencies on social and economic problems in the Republic; and from a survey of 130 classroom teachers we are in the process of analyzing. Some of the problems, issues and developments we discuss are shared by many former Soviet republics; some are unique to the Central Asian states; and others to the Republic of Kazakstan itself. Since there is virtually nothing in English on formal education in Kazakstan - neither before, during or following independence - it is our view that the following narrative ought to be of particular interest to the international education community.

AN IMPOSED EDUCATIONAL PAST

Today's Kazakstan was once part of the larger region of Turkestan until the Soviets developed republican boundaries for all Central Asian states. Unlike the more sedentary and "urbanized" of these states (Uzbekistan in particular), ethnic Kazaks were of nomadic origin, and thus saw little need for formal schooling. Unlike either formerly Soviet Eastern European states with centuries of formal Western education history, or like other Central Asian republics with an Islamic past, schooling in Kazakstan was primarily an imposed one formed and operated first by the Russians and then by the Soviets.

For such reasons, there is virtually nothing on formal education in Kazakstan which is not some version of Soviet school history. The collectivist nature of Soviet-style education from the Stalinist era forward came to emphasize central control over almost all curricular and administrative matters. The ministry system which evolved to run Soviet agriculture and industry also developed to govern schools and universities. Central planning formulated and administered education policy from day care centers through doctoral level training, and by the 1950s, mathematics and the hard sciences were the primary focus of a socialist curriculum dedicated to national ideological, economic and military objectives. Particularly minimized in Soviet education policy - with profound implications for today's school restructuring efforts - was any formal concern with designing educational programs based upon differences in measured individual differences. Official policies uniformly stressed <u>equal</u> rather than different curricular efforts for children until almost the end of secondary education.2

Various curricular teachings to be found in Western Humanities and Social Sciences at secondary and higher education levels were also rarely incorporated into the Soviet curriculum. Western philosophy and literature were eschewed as bourgeois and elitist, as "scientific socialism" was considered unavoidable as the inevitable stage of all human social organization. The West's Platonic assumptions of the superiority of philosophical and conceptual knowledge was rigorously rejected in the USSR in favor of the "dignity of productive labor," and Western social sciences were judged unacceptable because they typically championed comparative and relativist understandings. In Soviet thought, Marx, Engels and Lenin had discovered the "truth" of collective life and the organizing role of the Communist Party. The job of educators was to support policies and institutions which would advance scientific socialism and help create the new Soviet "Man." Other sources of authority for what or how to teach was also nearly impossible prior to the 1980s for there was no independent educational research and development community as we have in the West. Occasionally, innovative techniques were tried out in "marginal" subjects like music and art, or in far-flung schools by creative thinkers out of Ministry view.3 Again, the implications of this fact for contemporary education reform in Kazakstan are severe, as we suggest in pages ahead.

THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Central Asia was in the nineteenth century to Russia as India was to England and Africa was to France: a target of Colonialism. The territory of the Kazaks was viewed as occupied by uncivilized nomads

poorly utilizing vast agricultural areas and in need of "civilizing." Russian merchants were also greatly interested in expanding their markets into and beyond the Asian Steppe. In the south and west, there were "civilizing" influences, but of the wrong type in the eyes of Moscow: Islamic Sultanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Kiva.

By the end of the nineteenth century, and even as the era of European colonialism was beginning to wane, all of Central Asia had fallen to advances of the czar. The territory that became Kazakstan was made inhabitable for later waves of immigrants and dependent upon Russian products by establishing of land "reforms" which made it impossible for nomadic clans to continue their former way of life; by forcing tribal groups to accept the authority of Russian governors; and by introducing schools where Russian history and language were foremost.

Although Islamic instruction was visible in some population centers, schools and a print-based education was still a rarity in Kazakstan until the third decade of the twentieth century. Following Bolshevik victories on the Steppe, many Kazak intellectuals had increased hopes for improved economic and political conditions. There were also hopes that Central Asian states would regain confiscated lands given away to foreign settlers during these years, and that local political and cultural autonomy might return under socialist control. As well, Soviet views of gender equality and (more) equal rights for women were goals of Soviet education and social policy.4 However, by the 1930s it became clear that the evolving Soviet state and its schools, like those under the former Czar, had no room for indigenous

customs or local control.5

Even worse, Soviet economic policy under Stalin and his successors came quickly to favor industrialization and collectivization, both of which were anathema to nomadic Steppe cultures:

> The Soviet period brought unprecedented suffering to the Kazakhs at the hands of mainly Russian or Russified communist party and state officials. Nomads were required to give up their tribal herds and way of life to join collective and state farms. In the ensuing turmoil, more than 1 million Kazakhs perished. ... As in other Soviet republics, natives who had been leading supporters of the communist cause were purged by Stalin as "bourgeois nationalists," (and) even after Stalin's death, Russians - among them Leonid Brezhnev - continued to be appointed by Moscow to head the Kazakh Communist Party.6

Ideological and scientific training increasingly served industrial development and scientific agriculture as major educational aims in the Kazakh SSR following the Great Patriotic War. Social progress was envisioned to come about only with commitment to the socialist ideal and the Communist Party. The school played a major role in the idea of progress, both for its curricular focus as well as for its ideological teachings:

> The children of shepards no longer had to share their fathers' fates if they were willing to pay the cost of participation, which was formal subscription to an official ideology that asserted the primacy of Moscow over all the republics and the superiority of the Russian culture over all national ones. ... The Kazakh

aspirant who want(ed) to rise in oblast, republic, or all-union politics (had to) be Russian-speaking and (had to) look and behave as a Russian (did). He need not be assimilated but he (had to) appear assimilated, so as not to "stick out" in Russian dominated settings any more than his unusual facial characteristics (made) necessary. The Kazakh candidate (had to) also work harder than his Russian competitor and prove himself more loyal. He (had to) demonstrate a commitment to Moscow"s goals and endorse its development strategy as the only way that true Kazakh development could be achieved: on the Russian road to Communism.7

THE STRUCTURE OF SCHOOLS IN THE KAZAK SSR

Resistance to Soviet education policy in Kazakstan during the 1930s was very visible, and met with the same sorts of results as were seen throughout the USSR. Provocative nationalist movements developed to counter Russian domination on the steppe, and the intellectuals which led them were typically to be found somewhere in schools and universities. The primary Kazakstani nationalist movement was championed by the Alash Orda party; a party whose membership was rooted out by Stalin and persecuted to the fullest. The purging and silencing of Kazakstan's most important early twentieth century intellectuals is an important theme in today's rediscovery of the new republic's past:

Stalin's Great Terror also cost the educational program. Trained teachers, especially Kazakhs, were always in short supply, but once the purge began anyone who had direct or even indirect contract with the Alash Orda-dominated ministry of education became suspect. How many of those arrested in the 1930s were

teachers is impossible to know, but it was admitted at the time that the educational system of Kazakhstan was in complete disarray by early 1934. Few teachers were left in the countryside, most rural school buildings had been torn down to use as fuel, and in many communities life was so precarious that--even had schooling been available--children could not have been spared from productive work to attend.8

By the cold war period, however, formal schooling was universal, compulsory, and well orchestrated towards the aims of creating the new socialist "man." Of particular focus was how schools could help to implement the major industrial and agricultural policies developed in Moscow. Heavy industry, munitions and space programs were developed in Northern Kazakstan where workers from throughout the USSR were assigned to work and live. As well, the 1950s saw the locally disastrous "Virgin Lands Campaign" under Khrushchev. This program aimed at transforming the vast Kazak Steppe and portions of Siberia - historically used as pasture lands for animal breeding and grazing - into the breadbasket of the entire Soviet Union. Since secondary schools were intimately involved with state industries and collective farms, educational enrollments beyond primary schools increased dramatically throughout this decade. This period also saw an ideological push from Moscow to channel many secondary school students into vocational and technical education programs, rather than to urge secondary school graduates toward higher education.9

Although the Virgin Lands policies proved to be an economic failure, and weapons research projects proved to be environmentally

disastrous, the educational programs which prepared students for entering these fields was quite successful. By 1979, primary schooling had become virtually universal, and in the 1980s almost every Kazak citizen had completed at least nine years of formal schooling. The national literacy rate approached 100%.10 As was the norm in all Soviet states, secondary education not only included heavy emphases on formal math and science curricula, but also typically involved some exposure to labor education. So too, most schools had students integrated some way into seasonal needs of collective farms and state industries outside of the classroom. But the ineffiencies of the larger Soviet economic system were also very present in Central Asia.

PERISTROIKA, GLASNOST, AND THE HOPES OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATORS

Economic crises of the Soviet system were increasingly revealed by Gorbachev as part of his campaign for Perestroika. The forces of Union-wide changes in the USSR began in about 1987 under the moniker of "Uskorrenia" (or acceleration), the initial phase of Perestroika (restructuring). The larger movement was begun as an effort to reform the economic system by improving manufacturing efficiency. Another part of this movement was "Demokratizatsia," a process which would theoretically empower factory work brigades to become involved with setting product standards and timetables for more efficient production. Yet, the structural problems of the Soviet Economy proved too deep to be solved by top-down administrative mandates and the limited abilities workers had to control economic imperatives which surrounded their industries. This lead to the period of "Glasnost" or openness from 1988: a period of wider social and economic criticism which led to the

eventual dismemberment of the Soviet Union and to the creation of many new independent republics, like Kazakstan.

In the 1980s, reform-minded professional educators tied many of their hopes for educational change to the national movement for Glasnost as well.11 They argued that just as the economic sector of the nation had been hampered for years by top-down and politically determined methods, schooling too had been systematically damaged over the years by the same dynamics. The Russian Minister of Education later reported such statistics for the former USSR:

> In Moscow only 10% of the graduates of the general education school continue(d) to work in the specialty that they acquired in school. In the country at large, in 1986, only 24% of school graduates selected a vocation that corresponded to the trade that they learned in school. Of 4 1/2 million school graduates that were sent to their first job in 1986, only 200,000 had skills that corresponded to the qualification level listed on their work certificate by the school.12

Soviet would-be school reformers became vocal supporters of a variety of school improvement notions counter to official pedagogy in the 1980s, arguing that such reforms were necessary for the broader political and economic reforms underway:

> In one sense, the reform movement was a local embodiment of high politics, taking its cue from the general directions of reform under Gorbachev, and especially glasnost and democratization. But it also represented the renewal or legitimation of long marginalized or even repressed perspectives in education, the

triumph of the progressive (used as a descriptive rather than a normative term) tradition against the educational establishment - the ministries, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and the official Teachers' Union. And the increasing official emphasis upon "the human factor" privledged education in the rhetoric of perestroika, for if the success of reform depended, in the long term, upon fostering qualities of initiative, independence and responsibility, what could be more logical than to begin with the schools? 13

AFTER THE SOVIET COLLAPSE: PEDAGOGICAL THRUSTS

Great debate began in many post-Soviet republics over the direction and organization of public schooling from 1991 onward. As a rule, however, innovative approaches came from below rather than from the top. Ministers of Education and their deputies were typically subservient to Finance and Labor Ministries, thus unwilling to challenge larger state economic and political agendas. Meanwhile, the ideas of prominent Soviet educators like Vladimir Matveev, Gennadii Iagodin and Edward Dneprov began to circulate throughout the former USSR. Russian Federation Eduction Minister Edward Dneprov came to power in the early 1990s, and outlined with a number of colleagues multiple innovative goals of his administration; goals which are discussed in Kazakstan today, but which have proven difficult to implement under the current economic and political realities.

Five goals targeted school control or organization: democratization; administrative decentralization; multiplicity; variability; and "alternativnost," (alternative schooling models).

the others focused upon curriculum and instruction: making schools more child centered; differentiation of learning based on student interests and abilities; lifelong education; and developmentalism (emphasizing active inquiry). All of these aims were to be undertaken upon the assumption that the school ought to be "in advance" of society.14

COMPLICATING THE PICTURE: THE EXPERIENCE OF KAZAKSTAN

Summaries of educational issues and trends in the former Soviet Union just before and just after the collapse read like romances to those of us who believe in democratic and liberal processes in education. We would all like to believe that some sort of "happy ending" is just around the post-Soviet corner. Unfortunately, economic and political issues in most new republics - and certainly in Kazakstan - are clear barriers to the sorts of schools and programs envisioned by pedagogues during the 1980s.

For each new republic, the costs of implementing reform as well as running schools at all were clearly underestimated by would-be reformers. In Kazakstan, a national economy already in decline from the mid 1980s took a further nosedive after independence:

> ... in general, Kazakstan's economy has traced a vertiginous decline since independence. ... The impact of this decline on the population has been pronounced. In 1993, inflation was approximately 2,500 percent (and) real wages declined by 33 percent across the republic during the first half of 1994, with greater losses in northern Kazakstan, where workers on average lost more than half their spending power. Inflation compounds the impact of industrial unemployment, which has begun to spread

through the economy in both open forms and more-disguised ones, such as reduced workweeks, forced vacations, and long periods in which workers are not paid.15

The fiscal crisis in education was particularly severe. In 1993, government expenses for education were 8.1% of Gross Domestic Product, falling to 3.2% in 1994, then to 3.1% in 1995. Since most government money is dedicated to salaries, this has meant that for three years there have been virtually no expenses at the national level for equipment, building repairs, maintenance or school equipment. In poorer districts, extensive damage has been done to some secondary schools as the lack of winter heating fuel burst water pipes and heating equipment. Teachers in 1995 earned approximately $45 (about 57% of the average worker wage for 1995) and were rarely paid on time anyway. Today, a teacher's salary does not pay enough to support even the average monthly household food budget in a country where education was previously highly valued and where food remains comparatively inexpensive.16

Ministry of Education authorities contend that money problems are the major obstacles they face in returning the education system back into the good shape they claim it was in as recently as 1991. However, recent studies suggest that redefining the curriculum, organization and governance of schools in Kazakstan today will involve much more than returning the system to what ever existed here before.17

THE STRUCTURE OF SCHOOLING IN KAZAKSTAN

For specific discussion we now turn to secondary schooling in Kazakstan. The (complete) Soviet secondary school evolved into one

educating students in grades 1 through 11 by the late 1980s. Within the complete secondary school there are three levels: primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary, each with a specified course of study. Depending upon demographic factors, (e.g., low population densities) primary schools (grades 1-4) and incomplete Secondary schools (grades 1-9) were and are not uncommon in Kazakstan. Students wishing to complete general secondary education from a school with only nine grades of instruction would then have to transfer to a complete secondary school. Alternatively, many students completing the 9th form would transfer to one of two types of vocational/professional schools for advanced training. In 1995, there were approximately 8,400 secondary schools (complete and incomplete) in Kazakstan, and 1,766 (primarily rural) primary only schools. Combined enrollments for these schools were 3.2 million students. Almost 80% of schools in the country are located in rural places many arguably too small for the sorts of comprehensive curriculum intended. XX Meanwhile, city schools often operate in double shifts due to the shortage of classroom space, a problem which began during the late Soviet era. This practice continues today also because many teachers can and must teach more than a regular course load in order to earn a living wage.

Pre-schools and public universities are also part of the education system of Kazakstan, as are hundreds of "childrens' palaces" which are specialized after-school institutions training students in art, music, drawing, etc. The republican government also runs several hundred boarding schools, orphanages, and special education centers. Most recently, private primary and secondary schools have begun to develop,

as well as specialized forms of higher secondary schools (the gymnasium and lycea) dedicated to advanced coursework required for increasingly competitive college admission.

CURRICULAR REFORM: NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

Schools in Kazakstan today suffer from two different sorts of curricular problems. One involves the necessary refocussing of schooling content now that the nation is independent and in a proclaimed "transition to a market economy." Such a transition requires rethinking (or perhaps inventing) cultural and national histories around which citizens of Kazakstan can form a stable state.18 And it involves systematic upgrading of all secondary school courses in economics and government, both of which were earlier aimed at ideological purity and indoctrination rather than comparative studies or reflective thinking. There are still no systematic courses here in such major topics found in the West like government, civics, sociology, psychology, or social studies (except geography).

In addition to the fiscal issues involved with creating new curricular materials and training teachers how to teach them, an entire separate set of issues related to the curriculum is how and who should undertake curriculum revision and assessment projects. There has never been in Kazakstan a system for independent and efficient curricular planning, and program evaluation which informs national goals is a greatly underdeveloped science throughout the former Soviet republics. Under the Soviet system, such planning was accomplished in Moscow, not in Almaty, the new republic's capital. And the use of data to guide education policy changes and priorities was not facilitated by all-

union authorities.19

Soviet educational objectives since the days of Stalin were almost always prescribed at the top (usually by the Communist Party) in the early days, and in later years the result of multiple political interests rather than deliberate thinking and rethinking among educational policy makers about fundamental units of knowledge. Eklof described the "curriculum overloading" approach to Soviet school content well; and this curriculum is still very visible in Kazakstan:

> Curriculum overloading was a way of avoiding fundamental change, and reflected processes occurring in the political environment as a whole. Interest group negotiations had become the way by which the Brezhnev leadership integrated all powerful sectors into the system. As long as the pie (economy) continued to grow, each group could be mollified with a small increment from year to year. Similarly, in education, various groups (the scientific community, ideologists, industrial managers) all pointed to the exponentially growing volume of knowledge in the world and demanded time to impart more information. But the potential of the economy, like that of the school day, was finally exhausted.20

Kazakstan was never allowed in the Soviet era to carefully inspect its secondary school objectives and fashion the sort of flexible curriculum observable in the West. For example, there is no agreed upon "equivalency of studies" concept here, and there has never been any counterpart to the Committee of Ten or "Cardinal Principles of Education" studies done in the U.S. which had the net effect of fundamentally transforming and simplifying the entire school

curriculum.21 Basic instruction, coupled with "learning how to learn," are just now visible preoccupations in Kazakstan. Here curriculum specialization has historically meant that each curricular unit has been theoretically constructed and presented independent of collaboration with subject matters even in nearly allied areas. Linkages between subjects and applied demonstrations of learning have been completely lost from the early Soviet period. A good illustration of this problem even today can be observed in continuing higher secondary education language practice.22 It is not uncommon in the Kazak schools today, for example, to observe students simultaneously studying two foreign languages (if teachers can be found), in addition to Russian and Kazak (discussed below). Students also typically study two or three math and science courses concurrently. The general logic here is that all such subjects are important and require a place in the weekly schedule. Little attention is given to overlap, duplication, or cognitive competition between subjects. And research upon curricular sequencing or age-appropriate materials remains and underdeveloped art.

There is great recognition in Kazakstan today that a new secondary education curriculum needs to be developed, and that this curriculum requires deleting huge amounts of ideological material and adding completely new subjects (on economics and on the environment, for example). There is also an understanding of the severe crisis throughout the system with regards to the national lack educational technology and of those who can teach such things as computer skills and applications. On the other hand, it is difficult to observe where the time will be found within the current curriculum to add such

studies, as no one is suggesting that the study of mathematics or languages (which occupy most of the curriculum) be scaled back. As talk continues about what a new national curriculum might look like, the Ministry of Education has allowed some schools to choose program variations; however, it is unclear whether information relevant to future decisions about the curriculum is being collected from these experimental schools for later policy making. Meanwhile, several very important curricular issues/topics have penetrated virtually every school in the country. These are topics which fall within the realm of culture, language and political socialization.

Kazaks were physically and culturally decimated by Russia and the USSR beginning in the 19th century, a story suggested earlier in this essay. Millions of Kazaks either were killed, starved to death or fled the country during forced collectivization and Stalin's later purges. Intent upon imposing pan-socialism, the teaching of national culture and native language was also both formally or informally forbidden from the 1930s until independence. Since 1991, repatriating self-exiled Kazaks from China and Mongolia has proceeded as one effort of increasing the percentage of Kazaks living in the territory of Kazakstan. This is clearly one policy indicating nationalist and ethnic concerns. But to educators in the general secondary school has fallen the greatest nation-building challenge: rediscovering and teaching the history of the nation and its people, and transmitting most of this knowledge in a native language which is not even a useable second language for most urban (and professional) Kazaks.

The government of Kazakstan has decreed that Kazak (a Turkic

language) is the national language, and that all citizens must be able to speak it for full participation in the civic and economic affairs of the country. Yet, fewer than 1% of Kazakstan's ethnic Russians (who now comprise less than 38% of the nation's population and are emigrating in large numbers to their ethnic homelands) speak Kazak. They have both appealed this move both internally and complained to the Russian Federation in an effort to restore Russian as at least an equal language under the new national constitution. Nevertheless, the teaching of Kazak to all students in the nation's schools has become a primary undertaking, complicated by the facts that many Kazaks, too, are not fluent in the language; that textbooks for such teachings are in short supply; and that obtaining trained teachers in many places is difficult due to the very low salaries earlier mentioned.23

Descriptions of the deeds of great batyrs - ethnic heroes of previous centuries - is found throughout the schools today (where there are teachers to teach such things), as are more recent contributions of pre-Soviet statesmen and the nationalist parties of the early twentieth century. Pictures of Kazak intellectuals purged and killed by Stalin in the 1930s also dot the walls of many school buildings.

But there remains some danger in dedicating too many resources and too much energy to the reconstructing of a useable and potentially exclusionary past for ethnic Kazaks throughout the curriculum. For example, there are over 100 different ethnic groups in Kazakstan today who are all wondering and worrying about their status in the new republic, now clearly dominated by ethnic Kazaks. Some of the larger minority ethnic groups do have instruction in their native languages

(e.g., German, Ukrainian, Uzbek, Uigher); but the larger question remains: will minority ethnic interests be any better represented in Kazak schools in the future than they were in former Soviet schools? And besides, subjects taught in the higher secondary school curriculum (and in higher education and technical schools) still usually require textbooks written in Russian. So, those students choosing to undertake their studies in Kazak or other Turkic languages are eventually forced to learn in Russian anyway for entrance to higher levels of education. Other cultural issues are also involved. For example, how much evil can be attributed to the Russian and Soviet colonizers of the past two hundred years when their vestiges are still powerfully present, and when many urban Kazaks still think fondly of the former USSR? Meanwhile, many Russian nationals have only known Kazakstan as home for three or four generations, and truly believe that Kazakstan is really still part of Russia.

Fiscally speaking, Russia remains omnipresent. Russia remains the largest trading partner of Kazakstan, and Russia controls Kazakstan's oil route to the Black Sea. And virtually the entire advertised future of Kazakstan is understood as a function of joint ventures with international companies dedicated to exploiting the huge oil reserves of the Tengez region in Western Kazakstan. At the same time, the political situation in the north of the country is always difficult. Dominated by Russian nationals who came to work in Soviet Industries, there is great sympathy in many northern oblasts for reunification with Russia when nationalist sentiments in Russia wax high. Kazakstan's president (since 1991) has been credited as perhaps the only Kazak

national that can unite the country during this transitional phase, for he steadfastly supported the USSR and claimed that Independence was a mistake until the final hour. He is thus considered a hero among his own nationality, and a friend of Russians in the north. Yet the lingering fear of Russia's "near abroad" policies and of the majority Russian ethnic presence in the north has prompted an announced move of the nation's capital from Almaty in the south to Akmola, which is more centrally located in the country. The Wall Street Journal summarized some of the above issues in May, 1996:

> Kazakstan is a mess: The country is a virtual dictatorship, organized crime is rife and the economy is ailing. But at least it is our mess, people here say. They fear that as Communist candidates gain support in Moscow - and as Russian nationalism echoes as a campaign theme - the independence of Kazakstan and its neighbors could be put into jeopardy. ... Although Western analysts say the fears of re-integration are overblown, people here aren't so sure. They cite a customs union treaty signed in April between Russian and Belarus and claim it was a major move to reconstitute the old Soviet Union. Even the name of the new union, they say, bodes ill: It is called the Community of Sovereign States, or SSR in Russian, dangerously close to SSSR, the Russian version of the old U.S.S.R.24

THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES

A fundamental problem of education reform in the republic of education is that schools, and particularly the secondary schools, have not been given the resources to maintain the quality that they had in

many areas during Soviet times, and likewise have not been given the resources to make the sorts of curricular changes demanded within free market and democratic learning environments:

> At the school level, the most pressing need is for basic classroom equipment and instructional materials. Schools at all levels are poorly equipped to meet the educational needs of economic transition. In comprehensive schools, language laboratory, science laboratory, and computer classroom equipment is outdated or entirely lacking. A top priority is to rehabilitate the schools to a level where they can resume carrying out their basic tasks.25

Ironically, the rhetoric of educators - that education is and ought to be a basic social and humanitarian undertaking - has seemingly helped to relegate (or keep) education and the Ministry of Education to a second order priority in the "Transition to a Market Economy" climate of the country. Seen primarily as a social and humanitarian service rather than as an arena of economic development, education (and health care) sectors have been targeted by the government as places to cut costs, since social costs need to be minimized during the current inflationary period.

At the same time, less formal (from the perspective of the Republican Ministry of Education) links between school and work inherited from the Soviet economic system have been seriously damaged in the past five years. Schools were expected to be able to solicit from local farms and industries (under the supervision of Oblast and Raion education departments) financial and equipment resources as

to the private sector as quickly as possible.27

Although some oblasts have weathered the economic storm better than others, overall educational expenditures are down about one third since 1990, at the same time that such things as energy costs, school supplies and textbooks are more expensive and more difficult to locate. In particular, textbooks printed in Kazak are in extremely short supply, since there is no textbook printing house within the nation and real dollars to purchase books even in Russian are difficult to come by.28 The textbook issue is even more serious in former Soviet school systems because teachers here have historically depended more heavily upon them in their instructional plans than in other nations. "Curriculum overloading" (see below) meant that often teachers were instructing on topics and themes added to the curriculum after their formal training. Retraining teachers to use new texts (if and when they appear) as a supplement to more active instructional strategies was thus another suggestion made by the ADB team in their 1995 study.

ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

Resource issues like those above have been compounded in Kazakstan by the fact that the costs of delivering well coordinated and essential educational services using some criteria of system-wide efficiency was never developed here or in most former Soviet Republics. As curricular topics or extra school programs were added or deleted from the schools, the costs for so doing were not directly tied to the mandates for change. That is, educational goals and objectives still emanate from the President and the Cabinet of Ministers in the fashion of edicts and goals, as they did in Soviet times. Yet, the details of defining and

providing programs are then left to numerous authorities in different governmental ministries, few of whom report directly to each other. Furthermore, data collected about programs or personnel are not centralized and shared among and between different agencies, which is a clear legacy of Soviet inefficiency. Dneprov described this situation in the following terms, also underlining that most contemporary school administrators throughout the former USSR are still in positions of power in the new republics:

> It is only with enormous reservations that one can call the existing multi-tiered ministerial system one of educational governance. For the employees of this system the very term "educational governance" is a highly abstract one. During a survey taken not long ago of three hundred administrators at various levels none could explain coherently what was meant by governance or what should be the focus of their efforts to administer education. Most of those surveyed felt that supervision (kontrol) was their central mission. ... proper educational governance is, above all, facilitating growth, the goal-oriented nurturing the seeds of the future, and building structures which embody long-term potential. ... Since we were not interested in genuine growth in education, nor analyzing which roads were promising and which were dead-ends, we had no need of authentic structures of governance. In such a model of bureaucratization the fundamental "system generating" factor inevitably (became), on the one hand, the stream of circulars from above and, on the other, accounting and form-filling from below.29

As the command economy matured in Kazakstan, separate ministries absorbed redundant manpower into their ranks partly by duplicating managerial and data tabulating tasks also being undertaken in other ministries or different (regional) levels. Thus, Republican ministries of Education and Finance, as well as Oblast Ministries of Education and District/Raion officials collect various data on and inspect schools frequently. Since these data are often not shared, schools end up reporting their progress and their operations and their needs to multiple managerial bureaucracies which sometimes have overlapping authority to approve or disapprove programs and expenses. Without a comparative base for assessing internal needs and operation priorities, and subject to announced goals for education from outside the ministry, the MoE was already faced with internal problems from the beginning of the new Republic.

Ministries of general education and higher education were combined soon after independence. In addition, there was a staff cut of 40% between 1991 and 1995, followed by the resignation and replacement of the first two Ministers of Education: the current Minister is the third in five years. Significantly, all three former and current ministers were/are higher education professors without significant secondary school teaching or administrative experience. But again, as suggested before, there is no real professional field of educational administration in the nation anyway.

While there is inside agreement that more money needs to be found for secondary education programs, and that a democratic and market

oriented nation needs new curricular aims and processes, little real action beyond proclamations of student and parental rights to a free and quality education have been forthcoming from the government.30 Outside reviews of the MoE have not surprisingly been more severe, suggesting that the transition to a market economy will involve even more than just clarifying and prioritizing educational goals for the new nation. They suggest that it will also involve restructuring the regulatory powers of the multiple ministries which have input into local school operations. One international study team further suggests that the Republican Ministry abandon most of its former regulatory strategies in years ahead, and concentrate rather upon policy formation and leadership rather than control. Supervision and evaluation, they suggest, ought to become major objectives of administrators closer to the schools themselves at the Oblast and Raion levels.

Although it may be unrealistic to expect the MoE to further relinquish its already challenged powers of control in Kazakstan, they have seemingly acknowledged the weakness of national data collection and evaluation systems. Warned that data ought to be collected for a purpose, not just as an end in itself, the MoE accepted a loan from the Asian Development Bank to establish and create a Management Information System - one of the first non-higher education collaborative projects undertaken by educational leaders in the new nation. The ADB's analysis of program evaluation and policy formation capabilities in Kazakstan today were quite consistent with Dneprov's earlier indictment of the former Soviet system:

The MoE has no analysis, planning, or monitoring function to

support budget preparation and resource allocation for the sector as a whole. Oblast Departments of Education have no responsibility and, therefore, no capability for local level analysis and planning. The MoF(inance) has only a beginning of some basic analysis capability. The sector's major actors at republican and local level (Ministries, Oblast DoE) are left without a focal point for market-oriented, sector wide monitoring and analysis and planning. Important education reform decisions are being taken without proper assessment of their cost and resource implications, budget feasibility and financial sustainability, and financial resource allocations are decided without adequate assessment of their implications for the operation of particular education sub-sector and for the educational process.31

ON INEQUALITY

Inequality in schooling access and outcomes historically had a much firmer grounding in Kazakstan than any politician or educator would ever admit before independence, and it still does. In Soviet times, progressing through the secondary school and into the university was the desired outcome for children of increasing numbers of parents, although better-connected and more affluent ones were clearly more able to accomplish this for their children. Efforts to expand vocational and technical education programs were thus resisted by urban and professional Russians and Kazaks when such programs were targeted at their children. Although the Soviet system was touted as classless, the route to higher education and better jobs lay in a combination of

successful academic secondary school performance as well as active participation in Communist Party youth groups. Membership in the Komsomol (the Young Communist League), organized at the secondary school level, for example, was critical to the advancement of many young people's lives.32

Two major issues thus exacerbate Kazakstan's educational situation as a result of the collapse of socialism. One involves poverty and the special educational problems of poor children in a country where once there were few poor children. In former days, poverty was of itself less a problem than it is today. Most children had the food, clothing and school supplies required for school attendance. Current data, however, suggests that as many as 37% of the population in Kazakstan now lives below the government's official poverty level. Pre-school and health services are thus increasingly critical at just the same time as access to them is greatly diminished. At the same time, the MoE has begun a policy of charging families for textbook use, which even they admit will be a problem for poorest families.

In a related vein, there has always been some measure of rural/urban inequality in the school resources afforded students in Kazakstan, both fiscally and culturally. Rural schools have always been primarily dependent upon oblast budgets (which supply about 80 % of local school fiscal resources), and these oblasts vary somewhat in their economic vitality. Rural schools (the vast majority in Kazakstan) also historically suffered much of the fate of other nations' rural schools: poorer trained teachers, smaller school size (which meant fewer recreational and instructional resources), and

greater distances to urban social and cultural events, which were greatly valued during Soviet times.33 Today's rural teachers and administrators complain that their students are less competitive in such areas as computer and language training than are students in urban places, and these are the two curricular areas in greatest demand. And there has typically been an ethnic component of this inequality. Urban areas of Kazakstan are far more heavily populated with ethnic Russians and other Europeans, while the countryside has larger concentrations of ethnic Kazaks and other Central Asian peoples.34

The second and also significant (but less often discussed) set of issues related to inequality involves the use of corruption and bribery to proceed through formal schooling in contemporary Kazakstan, now that the Communist Party no longer informally controls the ethical and moral channels of the nation. Although there are obviously no data related to these themes, anecdotal evidence abounds. Teachers often inquire about the personal background and professional situation (or the types of animals owned) of students' parents. Such information sets the stage for later requests for presents by many teachers. In higher education, bribes are often expected for entry into the university, and certainly for entrance in more prestigious schools and faculties (law or international relations, for example).

In a command era, grade inflation and low retention rates were likely involved in problems of national occupational inefficiency. A major problem for the Soviet Union during the last decades of its existence involved finding work for increasing numbers of Central Asians, as Kazak and Uzbek households (for example) produced far more

children than European and Slavic ones. Full employment policies then emphasized inclusion and often redundant work (shorter work weeks, partial employment, etc.), thus the screening function of secondary schools was reduced.35

In this regard, there are national school leaving examinations, but they are graded by local teaches, not those experts in the republican test center who compose them. And they are not used by universities as mechanisms for screening applicants. Secondary school grades are also remain of little discriminatory: grade inflation is very high, and secondary grade repetition rates are extremely low (approximately 1% per year between 1991 and 1995).36

In secondary schools, marginal students with connections can still succeed in school, as do talented students who did not fully apply their skills to their studies. Simis argues that bribery and corruption in the Soviet school system began in kindergarten with gifts to teachers, and continued all the way through the University. He further suggested that matters were worse in Central Asia and the Caucuses than in Russia proper. He described one exposed payoff scheme and system for admission to a Soviet technical institute where bribery was the decisive admittance factor:

> In the Soviet Union the system for entering higher educational institutions is by competitive examinations: all students have to take written and oral examinations, each marked on a scale of one to five. The modus operandi of one illegal organization was fully revealed during the course of (their trial for corruption). The most active role in the group belonged to the secretary of the

selection committee. This (Assistant Professor) was given information about those with whom an agreement had been reached. She informed the teachers in the illegal group (at the examination) whom to give a passing mark to. If there were too many candidates to remember, a discreet sign - such as a dot in a previously decided upon color - was placed next to the names. It was (another person's) duty to draw up the list of those who were to be admitted into the institute as a result of the exams. Naturally she included those students for whom a bribe had been paid. And then this list was forwarded for the approval of another member of the illegal group, the assistant dean ... . Each new crop of students brought the illegal group 50,000 - 60,000 rubles.37

Many students in Kazakstan today, as in Soviet times, are passed along into the universities with high marks due to payoffs and personal connections. Such dynamics are arguably even worse today in Kazakstan both because of the historical importance of kinship and family ties (where helping friends and family up the educational and economic system remains a mutual expectation from the nomadic past), as well as a modern economic necessity where teachers and professors now barely earn a minimum wage. Once through the university, graduates (who also often continue to bribe teachers for good school marks) can be assigned placement into relevant ministries, or seek private sector employment commensurate with formal school completion. Finding something for the subsequent oversupply of labor used to be the task of some industry other than that of the MoE.38

Today, however, the linkage between university completion and jobs in the private sector (which also pay better) is less clear. Only time will tell whether private higher education initiatives may short-circuit excesses of the former system, although the government still has the ability to approve or refuse the establishment of such institutions. Within higher education, there is thus a fierce competition to enroll in faculties touted as closely related to the coming market economy (such as in almost anything related to business, economics, or international relations). University rectors and other senior administrators are therefore powerful players in the education scene, for they still have direct and indirect involvement with college entry procedures as suggested above. Many (if not most) are still alleged to pay special consideration to students from important families or those with extra money to spend to ensure the entry of students into the university. Downsizing of the MoE has led many former deputies and senior administrators into the ranks of higher education where theoretically they can "earn" many extra dollars for admittance decisions they are able to influence.

The Chronicle of Higher Education recently published an overview of higher education issues in Central Asia since independence, concluding in a manner consistent with the above. Needless to say, the educational and occupational prospects of students from poorer and minority households appears dim in a system where objective measures of school performance are comparatively underdeveloped, and where many educators are on the take:

... hard times have forced some of the best professors to emigrate

and have enveloped the institutions they left behind in a fog of apathy and corruption. The activism that was alive at Central Asian universities during the reform drive of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has all but vanished, replaced by inertia and obeisance to the government.39

The recent Asian Development Bank study went even further, hypothesizing that perceptions of poorer students regarding their unlikelihood of being allowed to enter the university explained lower secondary school leaving rates since 1991. This study team further expressed understated amazement over the non-standardized assessment procedures used to evaluate student performance throughout the national system of secondary education:

> Test results are not monitored by the ministry of Education, even for national examinations for students exiting grades 9 and 11. Thus, it (is) not possible to obtain information on student achievement. Learning gain, as an indicator of quality, (can) not be measured. For grades other than 9 and 11, teachers determine grade progression and retention taking into account test results and other factors. The tests are developed by the teachers themselves. The questions are based on subject and content themes that the teacher determines that the student should know. In principle, knowledge, skills, and attitudes are assessed. The scoring (however) is done by the teachers themselves. Thus, the process is very subjective.40

THE COMING OF PRIVATE AND TALENTED EDUCATION

Higher education in Kazakstan remains highly valued, but fiscal

problems have led to system-wide downsizing. Higher education enrollments have been scaled back by almost 13% since 1991; several dozen former academic specialties are no longer funded; and 13 higher education institutions previously run by other ministries have been placed under the control of the MoE. In addition to the 60 public higher education institutions in the nation in 1995, several dozen private universities began operating this decade, and the number of students receiving a free higher education has diminished by 5% since 1994. The ministry further intends to increase the percentages of fee-paying students in higher education during the next five years, while closing and consolidating other public universities.41

The implications of restricting access to higher education even further to those who can afford tuition fees and/or who can take advantage of personal connections weakens even further the eroding system of all schools. The proclaimed universal and equal system of education of Kazakstan inherited from the Soviet era - whatever its curricular and ideological faults - will be a victim (or beneficiary) of a very unequal future.

Equal access to public education has often been promised in the developed nations, but typically fought for by disenfranchised groups who recognized that promises were not being met. In the former Soviet Union, there are few non-government organizations which champion either general or issue-specific causes of citizens. Those objecting to the status quo or politically organizing for change were often jailed. Kazakstan shares the contemporary problem of a serious lack in citizens' advocacy groups or civic organizations to lobby for social or

economic improvement, and the fact that schools are in serious disrepair and understaffed is "explained" by the government as a logical outcome of fiscal difficulties rather than a choice made by leaders of the nation.

Formal schooling, though, is still viewed as a critical avenue to school success, and wealthier parents are willing to spend their money upon the education of their children. This has led to announcements from the President (and the MoE) that "non-state" (private) secondary education is acceptable and even desirable in the republic. Their claim is that wealthier parents now want better educational opportunities for their children than the state can afford to pay; that the renting of former public school buildings provides revenue to the republic for remaining public schools; and that innovative programs can be tried there for new teaching ideas.

All of this is likely true: yet, such efforts to privatize secondary education are also a way that more affluent parents can actually purchase a much higher quality education for their children with partial government subsidies (in terms of low rents for government facilities). Thus, for the equivalent of 20 or 30 or 40 dollars per month, some schools can afford to hire the best teachers remaining in education; can afford to heat their buildings; and can purchase computers and software for their use. At the time of this writing, non-state schools were still a fragile undertaking, because most parents do not even have minimal funds to pay for extra schooling, and the MoE is still unclear how to "control" non-state schools. But we predict this institutional type will likely grow in the cities where

they are feasible.

On the other hand, more affluent and prominent parents in the countryside have even less ability to pay modest sums for special educational opportunities for their children. The numbers are just to small. Seemingly recognizing this fact, the president of the republic issued a call for leaders throughout the land to help identify gifted and talented youngsters who might benefit from special educational opportunities (likely boarding school programs in the city) underwritten by the government. In a nation with no assessment techniques for objectively identifying talented students and where bribery and corruption remains very visible, surely inequality will worsen under such a scheme. Children of local politicians and wealthy families - mostly of Kazak descent - will undoubtedly gain from such proposals, while others in the countryside will languish with their eroding schools.

CONCLUSION

Evaluating the likely success of educational reform in the republic of Kazakstan during its period of economic and political transition is a difficult chore, for there is reason for both optimism as well as pessimism. On the positive side, curricular reforms dealing with local histories and language policy proceeds rapidly, as does curricular development in social and historical studies once dominated by ideological concerns. As well, there are numerous international organizations eager to help the new republic in its information needs and to provide technical advice and assistance on a myriad of administrative and organizational matters. And, very importantly,

education was and remains highly valued. School reform here does not need adult or non-formal education to jump-start educational demand. It already exists.

On the other hand, there are some serious short and long term policy problems in Kazakstan which give pause for concern. The poor financing of education in the current era will surely mean that valuable ground will be lost in educational processes and outcomes for the short term, just as educational expenditures and expectations in many developed countries are accelerating. Kazakstan is a nation without enough money to heat its existing school buildings, let alone to invest in new facilities and new equipment which is greatly needed.

In addition, however, to money and materials issues, there are education policy and direction issues in Kazakstan which may be even more difficult to alter under current social and political conditions. There is no tradition here, for example, of decentralized school decision making and civic participation in school affairs (or any others) 49. Likewise, in contradistinction to former Soviet Republics with earlier formal schooling traditions, there are few examples of what schools ought to look like and what the curriculum ought to be that pre-date the 1920s. There also has been and remain serious rural/urban inequality in the provision of education in the republic even when it was under Soviet domination. And there are no government policies which seek to eliminate this inequality.

At higher levels, political leaders appear willing to allow schools to deteriorate as a necessary concession to private sector development, believing that lofty stated aims and the possible

proliferation of non-state schools can fill a growing educational void. In the meantime, thousands of teachers have left the field, and generations of remaining school administrators believe that administration means finding what schools are doing wrong, and then issuing sanctions. Worse yet, there are those who actually profit from existing inequities and corruption in the system. And these individuals will likely be able to effectively block the potential advances in educational assessment and administration which need to occur in order for the system of education to achieve many of its stated equity and excellence objectives.

While we do see rays of hope for the achievement of educational quality in Kazakstan, we also have feelings of despair. Try as we might, we are to able find few current internal professional or political education reform directions of a vanguard nature in Kazakstan. The problems here are not only fiscal and technical, they are also moral and political. We do not believe that the schools will be able to significantly reform themselves, nor that the government will soon change things for the better. Rather, market reforms which will reinforce some measures of efficiency and civic reforms which will challenge government policy must emerge as primary change mechanisms. In Kazakstan, this may take a long time.

FOOTNOTES

1. The primary author of this manuscript spent 1996 as J. William Fulbright Lecturer and Researcher at the Almaty State (Abai) University in Almaty, Kazakstan. The second author is Vice Rector for International Affairs and an Independent Advisor to the Asian Development Bank on higher education policy and to the SOROS Foundation. Special thanks to Julia Abdoullaeva, Bakhyt Akshalova, Doran Bernard and James Binney for their help related to this manuscript.

2. See Brian Holmes, Gerald Read and Natalya Voskresenskaya, Russian Education: Tradition and Transition. New York: Garland Publishing, 1995. See also Stephen Kerr's, "USSR" in P. Cookson, A. Sednovik, and S. Semel, (eds.) International Handbook of Educational Reform. New York: Greenwood Press: 473-493, 1993; and Mervyn Mathew's Education in the Soviet Union. London: , 1982

3. See Ben Eklof's "Democracy in the Russian School: Educational Reform Since 1984." In Democracy in the Russian School: The Reform Movement in Education Since 1984, Eklof B., and Dneprov, E. (eds.). Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 1-33.

4. Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987. This work is frequently referenced throughout this monograph as the most authoritative English language discussion of the people, culture and politics of Kazakstan available. See her discussion of Kazak political hopes

as well as early Bolshevik social policy on the Asian Steppe.

5. Ibid, pp 170-171
6. James Critchlow, "Kazakstan: The Outlook for Ethnic Relations." RFE/RL Research Report:31(1, no. 5) 1992, p. 34.
7. Olcott, op. cit. pp 248-249
8. Ibid, p. 194
9. See this discussion in Mervyn Mathews, op.cit.
10. See this discussion/statistics in Olcott, esp. Appendix 13.
11. Delbert Long, Continuity and Change in Soviet Education under Gorbachev. American Educational Research Journal 27(3) 1990: 403-423.
12. Ibid, p. 411.
13. Eklof, op. cit, p. 9.
14. Ibid.
15. Martha Olcott, The Kazaks (2nd edition). Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1995, pp 282-283.
16. Jurinov, M. (Minister of Education, Republic of Kazakstan) "About the Present Condition and Development Perspectives of the Higher Educational System of the Republic of Kazakstan." Report to the Cabinet of Ministers, Almaty, KZ, Winter 1995.
17. Teacher's views about the collapse of government support for public schooling is the focus of our recent research. In a survey of 130 classroom teachers from the cities of Almaty and Rudnii, remaining teachers report feelings of abandonement and destruction of the system of schooling by the government. Preliminary results of this survey are available in Alan DeYoung and Galina Valyaeva,

"On Teachers' Perceptions of Kazak School Reform." Conference on Central Asia, Indiana University, Bloomington, February, 1997. See also the statistical description in the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) seven volume document "Technical Assistance for the Education and Training Sector Study." Manilla: the Philippines, 1995. See also the United Nations Human Development Report, "Kazakstan: The Challenge of Transition." Almaty, KZ: 1995.

18. See Daniel Chirot for an excellent discussion of the problem of nationality as a political concept in the late 20th century. In "National Liberations and nationalist nightmares: The consequences of the end of empires in the twentieth century." In Markets, States and Democracy, Betty Crawford (ed.). Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1995. Also, see James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan. Boulder Colorado, Westview Press, 1991.

19. ADB ibid: Annex 1 (Review of Education Organization and Management.)

20. Eklof, op.cit. pp 6-7.

21. See Henry Perkinson, The Imperfect Panacea: American Faith in Education (fourth edition). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995. Chapter 5. The ADB (op.cit.) study team included in their recommendations to the MoE for higher secondary school reform that they consider the "International Baccalaureate Diploma" as one model for curricular simplification. This European curricular model is very similar to the academic course of studies followed in many American secondary schools today.

22. See "Concept of the Basic Content of General Secondary Education

in the Republic of Kazakstan." Collegium of the MoE of the Republic of Kazakstan, February, 1994.

23. Ministry of Education, Republic of Kazakstan. "Education of Kazakhstan in the Period of Transition." MoE, Almaty, 1995.
24. Wall Street Journal, Friday, May 3, 1996, pg. 8.
25. Asian Development Bank, "Educational Rehabilitation and Management Improvement Project (Kazakhstan)," November, 1995, p. 5.
26. For example, the MoE was unclear why the Asian Development Bank was interested in an education sector study, since they had no experience with the idea that people are resources for economic development and that "investing in people" through school reform is a typical focus of economic development agencies. See Alan J. DeYoung, Economics and American Education (New York: Longman, 1989) for discussion of this theme.
27. Suzhikova Balzhan, "Kazakstan: Education in Transition." Report to the Cabinet of Ministers, Almaty, May 1996.
28. ADB, op. cit. Another very active group in Central Asia which is developing texts in the native language is The SOROS Foundation.
29. Edward Dneprov, "Bureaucratic Tyranny (must be eliminated from the school)." In Eklof and Dneprov, op.cit: 36-41.
30. The Government has two major documents related to education rights in Kazakstan: The Law of Education, and the Law of Higher Education. Neither constitutes a set of laws in any judicial sense; rather, they are general statements regarding aims and goals of national education. And neither has led to specific policy formulation.

31. ADB, op.cit. See especially Annex 1: "Review of Education Organization and Management."

32. Mervyn Mathews, op. cit.

33. See the essays in William Fierman's Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation op. cit., and Martha Olcott, op.cit.

34. Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia. London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1990op. cit.

35. This observation coincides with Dneprov's argument noted in footnote 21. Virtually every professor and student confided to the primary author that they had either taken or given a bribe of some sort or another during their educational careers. Students reported being asked to "leave behind" attractive new outerwear by teachers, or presenting expensive presents to teachers in advance of an oral examination in hopes (usually realized) that the exact question to be asked might be revealed in casual conversation. See Konstantin Simis also talks about this phenomenon in USSR - The Corrupt Society: The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982; and Uri Ra'anan as does Igor Lukes (ed.) in Inside the Apparat, esp. chapter 1, "Careers, Appointments, Promotions, Dismissals and Alignments."

36. ADB, op.cit. Annex 3, "Review of Basic Education"

37. Konstantin Simis, op. cit., pp 231-232.

38. See Nancy Lubin, Labor and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise. London, MacMillan, 1984.

39. The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 22, 1996, p. A39.

40. Asian Development Bank, op.cit., Annex 3, p.26.

41. See this discussion in Annex 4 of the ADB report (op.cit.) on higher education.